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ACHIEVING BETTER ACQUISITION THROUGH ADR 







This project examines bid protest prevention and resolution strategies to shed 
light on ways to save the government money and time.  Successful resolutions of protests 
depends on a number of factors, including government and private sector protest 
management and litigation strategies; Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) policies of 
federal agencies; legal and regulatory requirements; and remedies available to 
contractors.   Our research identifies and analyzes best ADR practices and other remedies 
and preventions for resolving bid protests.  Areas examined include processes and 
remedies utilized by selected federal agencies and obstacles to fomenting improved 
cooperation between industry and government, which may preclude win-win resolutions 
to bid protests.   Insights regarding the validity of our entering hypotheses about ADR are 
obtained from a survey of acquisition and legal professionals regarding their perceptions, 
opinions, and recommendations on bid protest practices and the use of ADR procedures.   
Our objectives are to identify ADR and other process improvement recommendations 
that are crucial to effective contracting and support the government’s efforts to improve 
adjudicative forums for resolution of contract disputes and bid protests.  Our research 
suggests that agencies can mitigate protest expenses and interruptions by managing the 
protest process in a systematic, business-like way.  At the present time, agencies rarely 
use most procedural tools that are required or authorized under federal laws and 
regulations to reduce time delays and costs from bid protests.  Among other things, we 
recommend energetic agency approaches to preventing disputes (e.g., quality 
debriefings), and dealing with disputes (e.g., formal cost-benefit analysis of agency 
defense strategies, strong defense of agency actions, and full use of ADR methods).  We 
also recommend ADR as the default method for settling bid protests.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The Office of Assistant Secretary for Acquisition, U.S. Department of the Air 
Force, requested the Naval Postgraduate School to study strategies to minimize time 
delays and costs borne by defense acquisition programs as a result of bid protests.  Bid 
protests are defined by the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) as:  
Written objection by an interested party to any of the following: a 
solicitation by an agency for offers for a contract for the procurement of 
property or services, the cancellation of the solicitation, an award or 
proposed award of the contract, and the termination of an award of the 
contract if the written objection contains an allegation that the termination 
is based in part, on the improprieties concerning the award of the 
contract.1   
The successful resolutions of protests depends on a number of factors, including 
government and private sector litigation strategies, the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR) policies of federal agencies, legal and regulatory requirements, and remedies 
available to contractors.   In the report that follows, we conclude that better ADR 
practices and other prevention and resolution strategies need to be identified and 
implemented.  The purpose of this project is to evaluate bid protest prevention and 
resolutions strategies and identify best practices in order to save the government money 
and time. 
B. BACKGROUND 
In any bid protest system, there are four principal parties: the disappointed offeror 
denied a contract award or potential offeror excluded from competition, the acquiring 
agency, the public at large and their elected representatives, and possibly, an intervening 
offeror or successful awardee.   Each principal has a distinct interest in the resolution of 
the protest.  The unsuccessful offerors seek a forum to air their complaints and to learn as 
much information as possible about denial or exclusion, and ultimately obtain some type 
                                                 
1 United States Code, 31 § 3551(1). 
  2
of meaningful relief.  The acquiring agency seeks a resolution to the protest in a manner 
that does not hinder the effectiveness or efficiency of the acquisition process.  The public 
seeks a resolution that promotes the integrity and effectiveness of the acquisition system 
while holding government officials accountable for their actions.2  The intervening 
offeror seeks resolution that supports the original award or favorable terms for award.   
There are a number of fora where a protestor can seek relief.   Protests can be 
filed with the procuring agency,3 with the Government Accountability Office (GAO)4, or 
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.5  The Comptroller General, head of the GAO, is 
mandated by CICA to provide “for the inexpensive and expeditious resolution of 
protests.”6  In 1995, President William J. Clinton signed Executive Order No. 12979 
mandating that agencies “to the maximum extent practicable, provide for inexpensive, 
informal, procedurally simple, and expeditious resolution of protests, including, where 
appropriate and as permitted by law, the use of alternative resolution techniques.” In that 
Order, President Clinton stated that these measures were intended “to ensure effective 
and efficient expenditure of public funds and fair and expeditious resolution of protests to 
the award of Federal procurement contracts.”  The Federal Acquisition Regulation also 
incorporates the tenets of CICA and E.O. 12979 in Subpart 33.1, Protests. 
Implementation of ADR practices is a major means by which the GAO and federal 
agencies can put into practice these legal obligations. 
During Fiscal Year 2008, 1,652 bid protests were filed with the GAO.  GAO 
issued formal decisions in 291 cases, sustaining 60 protests (more detailed statistics are 
provided in Chapter II).  In the same year, GAO utilized self-described ADR practices to 
resolve 78 cases, citing a 78% success rate.  Success in these instances is defined as 
resolution absent a formal GAO decision.7  In general, the GAO utilizes two types of 
                                                 
2 Daniel I. Gordon, “Constructing a Bid Protest Process: Choices Every Procurement Challenge 
System Must Make,” Public Contract Law Journal 3 (2006): 4. 
3 Code of Federal Regulations, 48 § 33.103(c). 
4 United States Code, 31 § 3551 et.  seq. 
5 United States Code, 28 § 1491(b). 
6 United States Code, 31 § 3554 (a)(1). 
7 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 09-251R. 
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ADR, negotiation assistance at the beginning and outcome prediction at the end of 
litigation (where the majority of costs and delays have already been incurred).8  The only 
substantial difference between outcome prediction and a formal decision is the issuance 
of a written decision by GAO.  In terms of time, effort, and cost, the processes are nearly 
identical. 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this project is to specifically identify, analyze, and develop better 
ADR practices and other prevention and resolution strategies to control protest costs and 
delays.  Such practices and strategies must, at a minimum, provide an interested party the 
opportunity for meaningful relief, promote the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
acquisition system, and preserve the public’s trust in the fairness of the acquisition 
process. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Since this project will consist of the identification and analysis of best ADR 
practices for resolving bid protests, the main focus will revolve around the primary 
research question of: What ADR strategies, remedies, or practices exist, that, if adopted 
by the Department of Defense (DoD), would lessen the systemic impact of bid protests 
on the acquisition process in terms of delays and costs? 
Specific areas addressed consist of processes and remedies utilized by selected 
federal agencies and the barriers to more effective cooperation between industry and 
government that may prohibit give-and-take compromises resulting in acceptable bid 
protests resolutions.  Our analysis will also answer the following research questions: 
 What strategies or practices are currently being used to minimize the 
impact of bid protest delays and costs on the acquisition process while 
maintaining integrity, economy, and efficiency? 
 What current processes or regulations preclude effective avoidance or 
resolution of bid protests in a manner that minimizes adverse impacts on 
the acquisition system? 
                                                 
8 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 09-4715P. 
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 What are the obstacles that impede effective cooperation in resolving bid 
protests? 
This research will provide decision makers with a usable analysis of current “best 
practice” examples along with recommendations. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
This project is based on a general literature review, including federal agency 
reports from the General Accounting Office, Department of Defense and Service 
component regulations, reports, journal articles, written texts, web searches, and surveys 
conducted with General Counsel and Acquisition leadership personnel within the military 
services and select federal/DoD agencies.  The research methodologies for this project 
include the following: 
 A survey of Legal and Acquisition leadership within the military services 
and select federal/DoD agencies. 
 A review of academic literature, government reports, government 
regulations and statutes, and other professional papers. 
 An analysis and comparison of bid protest practices within the Army 
Materiel Command (AMC), the GAO, and the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA).  
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This project is organized into seven chapters.  Chapter II provides an overview of 
the current bid protest process along with background information.  Chapter III provides 
an analysis of FAA and AMC bid protest procedures compared with those of the GAO.  
Chapter IV describes our survey goals, design, methodology, and scoring.  Chapter V 
discusses our survey results and provides an in depth analysis of the results.  Chapter VI 
is our conclusion, summarizing the results of our project.  Chapter VII details our 




In a 2006 paper entitled “Constructing a Bid Protest Process: Choices Every 
Procurement Challenge System Must Make,” current Administrator for Federal 
Procurement Policy and then-GAO Associate General Counsel Daniel Gordon, described 
a protest as an action that is “always between the agency and a vendor that wants but 
does not have a contract.”9 A protester is typically a party aggrieved by the actions of a 
government agency that resulted or could result in the award of a contract to an offeror 
viewed by the protester as non-deserving for various reasons.  Both the Competition and 
Contracting Act and the Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 33 permits protests to be 
resolved through judicial or administrative litigation, but informal procedures are 
encouraged.10  One of the key requirements to prevail in a bid protest is a showing that 
the protester has been prejudiced by improper agency activities.  The mere presence of 
mistake or illegal action does not necessarily imply a protest has merit unless the 
protestor can show they were in some way prejudiced by the agency’s mistake or illegal 
activity.  In other words, the mistake or illegality must affect acquisition planning or 
award decision.  A protester who prevails is entitled to a remedy, usually in the form of 
corrections in the bidding process or monetary reimbursement of bid and proposal costs 
and/or legal consultation fees. 
The Comptroller General of the Government Accountability Office is mandated 
by CICA to provide “for the inexpensive and expeditious resolution of protests.”11 With 
this legal mandate comes a necessary duty to serve the public interest.  As noted by the 
GAO’s General Counsel, Mr.  Gary Kepplinger, the GAO seeks: 
…to balance the competing interests and goals of the procurement 
process...the presence of an independent forum for disappointed bidders 
                                                 
9 Gordon, “Constructing a Bid Protest Process: Choices Every Procurement Challenge System Must 
Make,” 2. 
10 Federal Acquisition Regulation, Subpart 33.1. 
11 United States Code, 31 § 3554 (a)(1). 
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enhances the accountability of procurement officials and agencies, opens a 
window of transparency into how the procurement system operates, and 
protects the integrity and legitimacy of a competitive and robust federal 
procurement process.12 
At the center of any bid protest is a certain inherent conflict between the needs of 
the agency concerned and the rights of the disappointed bidder.  An efficient bid protest 
process must ensure protests are handled expeditiously, thereby minimizing the  
disruption to the acquisition process.  An effective system must ensure disappointed 
bidders are given a forum to air their grievances and agency officials are held accountable 
for their actions.13  Figure 1 illustrates this concept. 
 
Figure 1.   Competing Interests in a Protest System 
                                                 
12 Gary Kepplinger, “Commentary: GAO's Bid Protest Role,” Federal Times (January 19, 2009): 1. 
13 Margaret M. Worthington and Louis P. Goldsman, Contracting with the Federal Government (New 
York: John Wiley, 1998), 472. 
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B. IMPACT ON ACQUISITION PROCESS 
The number of protests filed has increased by 37% between FY 2001 and FY 
2008.14  Bid protests continue to have a systemic impact on the acquisition system.  
Figure 2, illustrates the trend in protests at the GAO over the last twenty years.   
 
 
Figure 2.   Number of Protests Filed at the GAO since 198915 
Though the number of protests has declined in historical terms, it is worth noting 
the increase in protests starting in FY 2001.  The number of protests filed at the GAO has 
increased by 37% between FY 2001 and FY 2008.16  Figure 3 contains detailed GAO bid 
protest statistics for FY’s 2001 through 2008.   Data from the Federal Procurement Data 
System shows that over the same period the number of federal contract actions fell by 
26.79% from 11,410,869 to 8,354,648, while total federal procurement dollars jumped by 
128.69% from $234,879,065,000 to $537,155,101,194.  
                                                 
14 Moshe Schwartz and Kate M. Manuel. United States.  GAO Bid Protests: Trends, Analysis, and 
Options for Congress.  Cong. Doc. CRS R40227. 2009, 2. 
15 U.S. Government Accountability Office, B-401197, 7. 
16 Moshe Schwartz and Kate M. Manuel. United States. GAO Bid Protests: Trends, Analysis, and 
Options for Congress. Cong. Doc. CRS R40227. 2009, 2. 
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FY 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Protests Filed 1,146        1,204        1,352      1,485      1,356      1,327      1,411        1,652      




311 256 290 365 306 249 335 291
Sustained in 
Whole or Part
66(21%) 41(16%) 50(17%) 75(21%) 71(23%) 72(29%) 91(27%) 60(21%)
Effectiveness Rate 33% 33% 33% 34% 37% 39% 38% 42%
Cases Resolved 
Through ADR




63(12%) 23(5%) 74(13%) 56(9%) 41(8%) 51(11%) 41(8%) 32(6%)
 
Figure 3.   GAO Bid Protest Statistics FY2001-FY200817 
The number of bid protests filed with the United States Court of Federal Claims is 
presented in Figure 4. 
FY 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Number of Cases 
Involving Bid Protests 54 57 39 55 69 61 73 70
Percentage of Cases 
Involving Bid Protests 6.8% 7.3% 2.6% 1.8% 2.9% 3.6% 6.8% 6.4%  
Figure 4.   Bid Protests at the United States Court of Federal Claims FY2000-FY200718 
Bid protests continue to have a systemic impact on the acquisition system.  No 
federal agency is more acutely aware of this trend than the Department of Defense.  As 
noted in 2007, by then Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (USD AT&L), the Honorable John J. Young: 
Protests are extremely detrimental to the warfighter and the taxpayer, 
[they] consume vast amounts of the time of acquisition, legal, and 
requirements team members; delay program initiation and the delivery of 
                                                 
17 Michael J. Schaengold, T. Michael Guiffré, Elizabeth M. Gill, “Choice of Forum for Federal 
Government Contract Bid Protests,” 18 Federal Bar Circuit Journal (2009): 255. 
18 Schanegold, Guiffré, and Gill, “Choice of Forum for Federal Government Contract Bid Protests,” 
255. 
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capability; strain relations with our industry partners and stakeholders; and 
create misperceptions among American citizens.19 
In general, all protests can potentially involve a delay in contract award or 
performance as well as internal and out-of-pocket costs.  The much-publicized case of the 
U.S. Air Force’s KC-X Air Refueling Tanker clearly demonstrates the impact protests 
can have on the acquisition system.  In January 2007, the Air Force issued a Request for 
Proposals (RFP).20  On February 29, 2008, the Air Force selected Northrop Grumman for 
contract award.  On March 11, 2008, Boeing filed a protest with the GAO, which the 
GAO sustained in a written decision on June 18, 2008.21  During the lengthy protest 
litigation, the Air Force paid the salaries of its nineteen-lawyer defense team, and the 
GAO decision recommended that the Air Force pay the fees of fifteen attorneys of record 
representing Boeing.  By October of 2009, the Air Force once again issued a “new” draft 
RFP for the KC-X tanker.22  To date, no award has been made.  Despite the merit the 
GAO found in Boeing’s protest (i.e. lack of discipline in the USAF source selection), 
there was a countervailing deleterious impact on the acquisition process.  For a period of 
over two years, the Air Force has been unable to award a contract for an air refueling 
tanker.  In fact, during 2008, bid protests delayed three major defense acquisition 
programs, valued at over $70 million.23 Such situations clearly underscore the point made 
by Undersecretary Young. 
Although the GAO has consistently resolved all protests within their required 
statutory time frame of 100 days,24 the systemic impact of protests still remain.  Both 
industry and government should welcome the implementation of a policy that could 
reduce this impact.  Alternative Dispute Resolution is one such policy that if used 
effectively, has such potential.  Additionally, ADR has the potential to preserve the 
                                                 
19 RDML Sean Crean, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition and Logistics 
Management,“Improving Communication during Competitive Source Selections,” Letter to Heads of 
Contracting Activities, January 8, 2008, 3. 
20 U.S. Government Accountability Office, B-311344, 5. 
21 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 08-991T, 3. 
22 U.S. Air Force FA8625-10-R-6600, 1. 
23 Schwartz, GAO Bid Protests: Trends, Analysis, and Options for Congress, 10. 
24 Schwartz, GAO Bid Protests: Trends, Analysis, and Options for Congress, 9. 
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delicate balance between the competing interests of the bid protest process and to 
empower military and civilian agencies to reduce protests costs and delays.  In order to 
understand this fully, one must have a basic understanding of how and when bid protests 
arise, the path they follow on their way to resolution, the defensive strategies that can be 
used to prevent protests and control their resolution path, and the cost and benefit trade-
offs agencies face from various protest defense strategies.   
C. AGENCY MANAGEMENT OF THE PROTEST PROCESS TO 
MITIGATE TIME DELAYS AND COSTS 
1. USE OF STAY OVERIDES TO MINIMIZE TIME DELAYS 
As FAR Subpart 33.1 indicates, a protest timely filed at the GAO or agency 
results in a mandatory stay of the procurement or proposed procurement.  Agencies can 
also impose discretionary stays.  The government can override a mandatory stay only 
based on “urgent and compelling circumstances which significantly affect the interest of 
the United States [that] will not permit waiting for the GAO’s decision” or based  on 
“best interests of the United States.”25  In general, a protest may occur at any one of five 
stages in the acquisition process. 
 Prior to solicitation (e.g., Requests for Information, FAR Part 5 Synopsis). 
 During the solicitation (e.g., Requests for Proposals, Invitation for Bids), 
Requests for Quotation). 
 During the evaluation (at creation of the competitive range) 
 Post Award 
 After agency-level protest 
At the agency level, a stay override is available on both grounds during the first 
four procurement stages.  If the agency-level resolution is not satisfactory to the protester 
and a GAO protests is filed, a stay override may be available at that time as well.  At the 
GAO, mandatory stays at two first pre-award stages can be overridden only for urgent 
and compelling circumstances if the award is likely within thirty days.  During the second 
and third stages, the 30-day requirement is not applicable and stays can be overridden for 
best interests.  If the protester is an incumbent denied new award, the agency may be 
                                                 
25 Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 33.104. 
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required to issue a bridge contract in lieu of override.  A protester may go to the Court of 
Federal Claims to challenge the override of stay at the GAO or agency level.  However, 
successful stay overrides are also risky.  If an agency ultimately loses the protest after 
obtaining a stay override, and performance has been substantially completed, the 
agency’s total contract cost would increase because the GAO would likely recommend 
the agency to pay the protester its legal fees as well as its bid and proposal costs.   The 
flow charts contained in Figures 5, 6, and 7 depict each of these instances for all protests 
instances at the GAO, as well as the decision points.  Protests filed at the Court of Federal 
Claims do not trigger automatic stays.  The Court may impose a stay through a 
Temporary Restraining Order or a Preliminary Injunction, or the government may agree 
to a voluntary stay in lieu of injunction.  They may avoid a stay by arguing that the 
protester is unlikely to succeed on the merits, the harm to the agency outweighs the harm 
to the protester, the public interest is served by allowing the procurement to continue, and 



























                                                 
26 Max V.  Kidalov and Diana Angelis, Naval Postgraduate School, Work Paper, “GAO Protest 












Figure 6.   GAO Protests Process (Request for Proposal/Invitation for Bid)27 
                                                 
27 Max V.  Kidalov and Diana Angelis, “GAO Protest Process Flow Charts and Guide to Managing 
Costs and Time Delays in Bid Protests”. 
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Figure 7.   GAO Protest Process (Post Award)28 
2. USE OF DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES TO MINIMZE TIME 
DELAYS AND COSTS 
In addition to stay overrides, agencies have five (5) choices of defensive strategies 
that may reduce or enlarge delays and costs from bid protests depending on the strategy 
chosen.  There are multiple possible strategies and resolutions to a protest: 
 The GAO dismisses the protest as frivolous, meritless, or outside of its 
jurisdiction (including one that is untimely or where prejudice is lacking). 
 The agency takes early voluntary corrective action and the protest is 
withdrawn. 
 ADR (as defined in the U.S. Department of Justice Electronic Guide to 
Federal Procurement ADR and cited in Appendix A) is utilized to resolve 
the protest and the protest is withdrawn. 
                                                 
28 Max V.  Kidalov and Diana Angelis, “GAO Protest Process Flow Charts and Guide to Managing 
Costs and Time Delays in Bid Protests”. 
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 The agency opts for a formal litigation before the GAO by filing an 
agency report.  The GAO may issue a written opinion or conduct one of 
two special kinds of GAO ADR (negotiation assistance or outcome 
prediction).   
 The agency opts for expedited litigation by seeking an express option. 
The first three options enable agencies to achieve full resolution at less than 30 
days and avoid paying protester legal fees.  Litigation under the fourth strategy can last 
one-hundred (100) days, and under the fifth strategy, sixty-five (65) days.  The last two 
strategies allow the agency to secure GAO validation of agency’s procurement decisions 
in the form of a favorable GAO opinion, but at the risk of having to pay protester its legal 
fees in the event of loss.  Upon receipt of a protest, the agency must determine how to 
defend against the protest.  If the agency believes that the protest is indeed frivolous, 
meritless, or jurisdiction, then it can seek summary dismissal from the GAO.  Barring 
such a dismissal from GAO, the agency must then prepare to defend its procurement 
action before the GAO (possibly utilizing the express option), take voluntary corrective 
action, or utilize ADR.   
Figure 8 depicts this process, as well as the decision points. 
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Figure 8.   Protest Response29 
3. USE OF ADR TO MINIMIZE TIME DELAYS AND COSTS 
A shown in Figure 8, there are essentially five decision points where an agency 
can influence the process.  As discussed earlier, an agency may seek dismissal from GAO 
on grounds that the protest is either meritless, frivolous, or lacks jurisdiction, an agency 
may take voluntary corrective action, or an agency may pursue ADR.  Should an agency 
attempt to litigate a protest and lose, the agency may be responsible for paying “the 
successful protestor” the cost for “filing and pursing the protest, including attorney’s fees 
and counsel and expert witness fees.”30  While the exact costs a protestor may incur in 
filing a protest varies, in the past GAO has recommended agencies pay successful 
                                                 
29 Kidalov and Angelis, “GAO Protest Process Flow Chart.” 
30 4 C.F.R. § 21.8(d)(1). 
  17
protestors payment in excess of $300,000.31 Any government strategy or practice short of 
adjudication may result in the government not having to reimburse a successful protestor 
for the costs associated with filing the protests.  As a result, in addition to time, ADR has 
the potential to save the government money. 
ADR is far from a new concept.  In 1995, President Clinton issued Executive 
Order No. 12979 mandating that agencies use “to the maximum extent practicable…the 
use of alternative dispute resolution techniques.”  Within GAO, there are two “ADR 
options” available, negotiation assistance and outcome prediction.32  Outcome prediction 
is the most common form of ADR employed by GAO.33  However, since negotiation 
assistance can occur prior to submission of the agency report, it offers the greatest 
potential to reduce the delay a protest has on a particular acquisition.  Conversely, 
outcome prediction takes place only after all issues have been raised and an evidentiary 
hearing has taken place,34 at which point the GAO attorney will advise the parties of the 
“likely outcome of the case.”35  
Thus, the substantial difference between outcome prediction and the formal 
adjudication of a protest is merely the absence of written decision by GAO in the former.  
In terms of minimizing delays to the acquisition process, it does not seem that outcome 
prediction is very a useful mechanism.  Outcome prediction serves to minimize the 
reputational damage to an agency or its official responsible for the procurement at issue, 
but does not prevent the same problem that led to the protest from occurring in the future. 
D. BENEFITS OF ADR IN RESOLVING PROTESTS 
As noted previously, protests usually involve a delay in either contract award or 
performance which can adversely impact the mission of the agency concerned.  A goal of 
ADR should be to minimize this delay.  Best ADR practices need to be identified and 
                                                 
31 U.S. Government Accountability Office, B-400058.4 
32 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 09-471SP, 27. 
33 William J. Spriggs and Max V. Kidalov, “No Way to Protest,” Legal Times (March 17, 2003): 2. 
34 Spriggs and Kidalov, “No Way to Protest,” 2. 
35 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 09-471SP, 27. 
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implemented by federal agencies.  One need not look further than the federal government 
itself to find numerous examples of successful ADR programs.     
 Statutorily exempt from the federal acquisition system under the 1996 
Department of Transportation (DOT) Appropriations Act36, the Federal Aviation 
Administration has developed its own set of procurement policies that include the use of 
ADR.   Similarly, in an effort to reduce the impact of protests, the United States Army 
Materiel Command, implemented a comprehensive ADR program of its own including 
agency level protest under the agency level protest authority.  A comparison of the 
FAA’s and AMC’s practices compared to those of the GAO process is presented in 
Chapter V. 
In order to gain insight into these practices, their use within various agencies, and 
to discover potential areas for improvement a comprehensive survey of federal 
government acquisition and legal professionals was conducted.  The methodology 
employed and the corresponding results and analysis are reported in Chapters III and IV, 
respectively. 
                                                 
36 Public Law 104-50. 
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III. SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
A. SURVEY GOALS 
In order to identify best practices, input was sought from top level acquisition and 
legal leaders and experts within the military departments and all major federal buying 
agencies.  Fifty-one individuals were asked to complete an online survey.  A copy of the 
survey protocol is contained in Appendix B.  The aim of the survey was to document the 
perceptions, opinions, and recommendations of those individuals involved in the 
acquisition process.  With this information, it is then possible to identify trends, best 
practices, and deficient areas that need improvement.  Through this process, we were able 
to develop recommendations that if adopted, could possibly reduce the systemic impact 
of bid protests on the acquisition cycle by empowering agencies to better manage protest 
costs and time disruptions. 
B. SURVEY DESIGN 
The survey focuses on three main research questions: 
 What strategies or practices are used by agencies to prevent/minimize the 
impact of bid protests? 
 To what extent are alternative dispute resolution procedures utilized as a 
means to prevent/minimize the impact of bid protests? 
 What aspects of statute, policy, or regulation preclude the effective 
resolution of protests in a manner that minimizes their systemic impact? 
Within each of these three areas of focus, respondents were asked to rate their 
agency’s use of specific strategies, practices, and policies pertaining to bid protests and 
ADR.  Respondents were also asked to identify what they believe to be the relevant 
factors that either constrain or encourage an aggrieved offeror to protest.  Lastly, 
respondents were asked to describe possible improvements to law, policy, or regulation, 
that would increase the effectiveness of the protest system, while at the same time, would 
ensure transparency, integrity, compliance, economy and efficiency. 
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C. SURVEY SCORING 
Respondents were asked to rate specific aspects of policy, strategy, and procedure 
on a four-point version of Likert’s eponymous rating scale (shown below). 
 4—Always or With Great Frequency 
 3—With Moderate Frequency 
 2—In Exceptional Cases or With Rare Frequency 
 1—Never 
Respondents were also given the option of choosing, “Don’t Know or Information 
Unavailable.” If a respondent chose this option, the response was not included in the 
scoring.  With respect to the relevant factors, that constrain our encourage protests and 
possible improvements to law, policy, or regulation, respondents were given the 
opportunity to post comments in a free form text box.   
D. SURVEY SUBJECTS 
Major federal procurement agencies were asked to participate in the survey.  A 
complete list of agencies solicited is contained in Appendix C.  Agency points of contact 
were obtained from publicly available information posted on agency websites or from 
personal contacts of this project’s lead advisor.  Each point of contact was sent an e-mail 
with a request to participate in the survey and a link to the SurveyMonkey website where 
the on-line survey was posted.  Point of contacts may have assigned additional 
respondents within their agency.  Respondents were asked to identify both their agency 
and their professional background (legal or acquisition) in the survey.  Respondents’ 
names and actual position within their agency were not collected and therefore remain 
anonymous. 
E. SURVEY LIMITATIONS 
It should be noted that this particular survey was not intended as a “hard data” 
appraisal of agency practices.  The results of the survey have not been measured against a 
specific set of objective criteria (e.g., number of protests per agency).  Rather, the survey 
was intended as a means to identify perceptions, opinions, and trends from those 
individuals who posses significant professional legal or acquisition expertise.  Further, it 
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should be noted that the data contained in the survey represent the individual opinions 
and impressions of the respondents, and should in no way be construed as reflecting an 
official agency position, policy, or opinion. 
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IV. SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. RESPONSE RATE AND BACKGROUND RESULTS 
Fifty-one acquisition and legal professionals, across twenty-two federal agencies 
were asked to participate in the survey.  Twenty-one personnel, representing ten federal 
agencies, ultimately participated in the survey, yielding an overall response rate of 41%.  
Fourteen respondents (67%) identified themselves as acquisition professionals, while 
seven respondents (33%) identified themselves as legal professionals.  These results are 
summarized in Figures 9 and 10. 
 
 




Figure 10.   Survey Respondents by Agency 
B. STRATEGIES AND PRACTICES TO MINIMIZE BID PROTEST 
IMPACT 
1. Most Frequently Cited Strategies and Practices 
Given a list of thirty different strategies and practices designed to minimize the 
impact of protests on the acquisition system, respondents were asked to rank their 
agency’s use of the strategy or practice.  Amongst all respondents, the most widely 
identified strategy and practice was to Set in advance clear and publicly disclosed 
evaluation criteria and adhering to those criteria during source selection, with a mean 
score of 3.48.  The second most cited strategy or practice was Advanced Acquisition 
Planning, with a mean score of 3.38.  Agency Procedures to prevent fraud, providing 
mandatory quality debriefings, market and research and engagement with industry, 
agency level protests procedures, and taking early corrective actions, are also highly 
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identified strategies and practices, each of which had a mean score at or above 3.0.  The 
overwhelming majority of respondents cited these practices with either moderate or great 
frequency.  The remaining three strategies have a score above 2.7 and below 3.0, and 
include independent expert reviews by task order ombudsmen or competition advocates, 
independent expert reviews by federal small business advocates, and greater training for 
acquisition workforce.  Only one strategy, taking early corrective action, can be 
characterized as a defensive strategy; the rest are preventive.  Further, almost all 
preventive strategies involve only the buying agency’s personnel, which can reinforce 
agency errors or violations instead of correcting them.  Overall, this data suggests that 
agencies may not be doing all they can or should to actively minimize protest costs and 
delays once a protest is filed.  The top ten defensive/preventive strategies and practices 
identified are summarized in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11.   Top Ten Defensive/Preventive Strategies and Practices Identified 
2. Least Frequently Cited Strategies and Practices 
Strategies and practices, such as refusing to follow GAO advisory opinions where 
the GAO sustains the protest on apparently wrong grounds, vigorous objections and 
request for sanctions in response to frivolous protests, and taking corrective actions 
involving direct awards to protesters, instead of re-competitions or re-evaluations, taking 
express option requests under GAO procedures are the least identified amongst 
respondents, with a mean score of less than or equal to 1.7.  Independent expert reviews 
by the GAO which Executive Branch agencies may request concerning matters of 
government spending under Title 31, Section 3529 of the United States Code, other 
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strategies (to be defined), ADR with assistance from the Court of Federal Claims or the 
GAO (such as GAO outcome prediction or negotiation assistance), corrective actions 
involving declaratory-type relief/changes to agency policies, ADR without assistance 
from the GAO or the Court of Federal Claims, and overrides based on best interests of 
the United States (which apply only to post-award and competitive range protests) all 
have mean scores above 1.7 and at or below 2.0.  The majority of respondents cite these 
strategies or practices as being used rarely, if ever.  These results suggest that agencies 
would rather insulate their procurement decisions from outside reviews than avoid 
protests.  Contrary to Executive Order 12979, agencies are reluctant to engage in ADR 
(and, therefore, conduct cost-benefit analysis, reconsider, or bargain over their 
procurement decisions).  Agencies are reluctant to expedite protest litigation and cut short 
the protest time from 100 days to less than 65 days.  At the same time, agencies are 
reluctant to risk disputes with Congress over GAO’s views on the merits of the agency 
procurement decision and with the Court of Federal Claims over the need to keep moving 
the acquisition programs free from mandatory stays.  However, agencies are also 
reluctant to end protests by rewarding protesters with direct contract awards.  This 
provides a disincentive to protesters seeking an easy contract through litigation.  Figure 
12 summarizes the ten least identified practices and strategies. 
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Figure 12.   Ten Least Cited Defensive/Preventive Strategies and Practices 
C. USE OF ADR PROCEDURES TO RESOLVE BID PROTESTS 
In general, survey respondents seem to believe that ADR procedures are 
infrequently used to resolve bid protests within their agencies.  This appears to contradict 
Executive Order No. 12979, which directs agencies to use to them to the maximum extent 
practicable.  The mean score of the eleven ADR procedures respondents were able to 
  29
choose from was 1.55, indicating that respondents believe their agency rarely, if ever, 
utilize ADR procedures to resolve bid protests.  The highest rated ADR procedure was 
negotiation, with a mean score of 2.24, implying that the majority of respondents believe 
their agency utilized this procedure to at least some extent.  All other ADR procedures 
scored at or below 1.87.  Other ADR procedures between the highest and the least used, 
in descending order, include: GAO outcome prediction, conciliation, GAO negotiation 
assistance, hybrid techniques, ADR with the assistance of the Court of Federal Claims, 
mediation, summary trial by a Board of Contract Appeals, mini-trial, and arbitration. 
The least identified named ADR procedure was evaluation by third-party neutrals, with a 
mean score of 1.29, implying that respondents believe this procedure is almost never 
utilized by their agency.  Other (to be defined) techniques had the score of 1.20.  These 
findings are somewhat surprising.  Intuitively, ADR should be favored by agencies 
concerned over costs or delays because engaging in ADR would enable the agency to 
conduct a cost-benefit analysis of its alternatives in the face of a protest and to bargain 
with the protester over these costs, benefits, and alternatives.  Further, new processes of 
re-evaluation and reconsideration of procurement decisions are inherent in the very 
nature of ADR.  This is because, as recommended by the U.S. Department of Justice 
Electronic Guide to Federal Procurement ADR, effective protest ADR requires an 
agency to conduct some fact-finding and a risk assessment involving strengths and 
weaknesses of agency position.  This process may be guided or refereed by a neutral 
person.  Survey data above on the most and least cited defensive/preventive strategies and 
practices shows that directed awards to protesters are rare - implying that new process is 
what the protester are most likely to get as relief.  Logically, as a matter of sound 
business management, agencies should make frequent, formal decisions to pursue ADRs 
of all types as their most frequently used defensive strategies.  Instead, the two most 
favored ADR measures are the least structured (negotiation) and the least ADR-like in 
terms of time and cost impact (GAO outcome prediction).  Figure 13 summarizes 
respondents’ beliefs of their agency’s use of ADR procedures to resolve bid protests. 
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Figure 13.   The Use of ADR Procedures to Resolve Bid Protests 
D. ASPECTS OF CURRENT POLICIES, PRACTICES, LAWS, OR 
REGULATIONS THAT PRECLUDE EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION OF 
PROTESTS 
1. Most Frequently Cited Policies, Practices, Laws, or Regulations 
When asked to rate a list of twenty policies, practices, and laws, respondents 
overwhelmingly noted the lack of fiscal disincentives for unjustified protests as the 
predominant policy factor that they believe precludes or prevents the effective resolution 
of bid protests.  With a mean score of 3.20, the majority of respondents feel this policy 
precludes effective resolution to at least a moderate extent.  Similar responses were found 
for factors, such as poor acquisition planning and lack of properly trained acquisition 
workforce, with mean scores of 3.10 and 3.0, respectively.  Lack of formal sanctions at 
the GAO for frivolous protests, strategic behavior by disappointed bidders seeking to 
recover bid and proposal costs without basis for award, frivolous protest filings, failure 
to maintain adequate documentation of procurement decisions, failure to assure 
adherence to stated evaluation criteria, delay-seeking strategies by incumbents without 
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basis for new awards, and poorly designed or implemented cost estimates all had mean 
scores from 2.88 to 2.39, respectfully. Presently, the GAO does not impose monetary or 
other sanctions for frivolous protests such as those imposed under Rule 11 of the Court of 
Federal Claims.  However, as previously shown in Figure 8, the GAO does dismiss 
frivolous protests.  Figure 14 lists the respondents’ top ten policies, practices, or laws that 
they believe preclude effective avoidance or resolution of protests. 
 
Figure 14.   Top Ten Policies, Practices or Laws that Preclude Effective Avoidance or 
Resolution of Protests 
2. Least Frequently Cited Policies, Practices, Laws, or Regulations 
Factors, such as a lack of, or deficiencies in, agency-level bid protest procedures, 
regulatory or statutory provisions discouraging ADR, and other deficiencies in ADR 
procedures, were the lowest rated factors with mean scores of less than 1.5, implying that 
respondents believe these factors rarely, if ever, preclude effective avoidance or 
resolution of bid protests.  A possible conclusion from this data is that there exists an 
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institutional lack of will to utilize ADR procedures.  Other least cited factors, with mean 
scores between 1.71 and 2.35, include agency reluctance or failure to seek stay overrides, 
agency reluctance to seek express option, agency reluctance to deviate from GAO 
recommendation, other aspects (to be defined), failure to assure fair discussions with 
offerors, and poor debriefings. This suggests that respondents do not regard unfair, 
unequal, or incomplete communications with offerors or agencies’ failure to use available 
tools to expedite programs during protests as making significant contributions to protest 
burdens experienced by agencies.  Figure 15 displays the ten least prevalent factors 
identified by survey respondents that preclude effective avoidance or resolution of 
protests. 
 
Figure 15.   Ten Least Utilized Factors Precluding Effective Avoidance or Resolution of Bid 
Protests 
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E. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
1. Introduction 
Thus far, results have been presented in terms of mean results and overall trends 
from all respondents.  However, survey respondents represent a diverse set of agencies, 
and have differing professional responsibilities.  Both military and civilian agencies are 
represented in the survey sample, as are both legal and acquisition professionals.  It is, 
therefore, worthwhile to consider how, or if, these factors in anyway influence survey 
results.  The following paragraphs compare civilian versus military perspectives and 
acquisition versus legal perspectives.   
2. Civilian vs. Military Perspective 
In general, respondents representing both civilian and military agencies believe 
their agencies, utilize with at least moderate frequency, a number of preventive or 
defensive strategies and practices to minimize the possible negative impacts of bid 
protests on the acquisition system.  Further, there is a striking similarity between the most 
frequently identified practices and strategies employed by respondents representing both 
civilian and military agencies.  Figure 16 compares the top ten strategies identified by 
respondents representing civilian agencies with the corresponding military agency score. 
 
Figure 16.   Top Ten Civilian Agency Strategies Compared to Military Agencies 
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With respect to the utilization of ADR practices to minimize the effect of bid 
protests, both groups of respondents indicated similar beliefs about the utilization of 
various ADR practices within their agency.  In general, respondents seem to believe that 
neither civilian nor military agencies utilize ADR practices to a great extent.  
Nonetheless, it appears respondents representing civilian agencies generally cite their 
agency’s use of negotiation to a greater extent than their military counterparts, with mean 
scores for this technique of 2.57 and 2.00, respectively.  This finding is inconsistent with 
the tenets of E.O. 12979, the FAR requirement for all parties to “use their best efforts to 
resolve concerns raised by an interested party at the contracting officer level through 
open and frank discussions,”37 and the direction of then-Undersecretary of Defense John 
Young and then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition and Logistics 
Management RDML Sean Crean for greater government-industry communications as a 
way to avoid bid protests.  Civilian agencies also topped their military counterparts in 
utilizing GAO outcome prediction, ADR with the assistance of the Court of Federal 
Claims, and, barely, with respect to mini-trials.  On the other hand, military agencies 
topped civilian agencies in the use of GAO negotiation assistance, conciliation, 
mediation, summary trials by the Board of Contract Appeals, hybrid techniques, other 
techniques (to be defined), and, barely, evaluation by third-party neutrals.  On 
arbitration, the civilian and military agencies were equal.  This suggests that, when 
military agencies actually use ADR, they are much more creative with their ADR 
approaches than civilian agencies.  However, negotiation was the only ADR technique 
was cited by the military with a mean score of equal or over 2.0.  This suggests that 
overall use of ADR in military agencies is very low.  Figure 17 compares the civilian 
agency respondent’s identification of ADR procedures with those of respondents 
representing military agencies. 
                                                 
37 Federal Acquisition Regulation 33.103(b). 
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Figure 17.   Comparison of Civilian Agency use of ADR Procedures with Military Agencies 
Amongst both groups of respondents there seems to be a strong similarity 
between their view of policies, practices, laws, and regulations that preclude effective 
avoidance or resolution of bid protests.  Both groups of respondents cite the lack of fiscal 
disincentives for unsuccessful protests as the most prevalent factor precluding effective 
resolution or avoidance of protests.  Both groups also cite poor acquisition planning and  
the lack of adequately trained acquisition personnel as significant factors in precluding 
the effective resolution or avoidance of protests.  However, there is a strong difference 
regarding the frequency with which respondents believe agency reluctance to seek award 
stay overrides precludes effective resolution or avoidance of bid protests.  Amongst 
military respondents, the mean score for this factor is 2.13 compared to 1.17 for civilian 
respondents.  Although the military score is still low, indicating respondents’ belief that 
this factor prevents effective avoidance or resolution of protests relatively infrequently, it 
nonetheless raises a number of possible implications.  It is possible that military agencies 
are less inclined to seek overrides of mandatory procurement stays than their civilian 
counterparts.  If time delays associated with a bid protest are in fact impeding mission 
accomplishments, then agencies should seek overrides in the best interests of the United 
States, consistent with FAR Part 33.104(c).  In terms of the most frequently cited reasons 
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precluding effective protest resolution, factors such as lack of properly trained 
acquisition workforce, strategic behavior by disappointed offerors with no legitimate 
basis for award in order to recover bid and proposal costs, lack of formal sanctions at 
the GAO for frivolous protests, frivolous protest filings, and failure to assure adherence 
to stated evaluation criteria are comparatively greater problems for military agencies.  
For civilian agencies, comparatively greater problems include lack of fiscal disincentives 
for unjustified protests such as “loser pays” arrangements, poor acquisition planning, 
delay-seeking strategies by incumbent contractors who have no legitimate basis for 
renewed award, and poor debriefings.  Figure 18 compares the ten most frequently 
identified responses of civilian agency respondents with those from military agencies. 
 
Figure 18.   Comparison of Ten Most Frequently Identified Civilian and Military Agency 
Perception of Processes, Laws, Policies, or Regulations. 
Military agencies cite comparatively lower problems with failure to assure fair 
discussions with offerors.  On the other hand, civilian agencies cite comparatively lower 
problems with all other categories, including regulatory or statutory provisions 
discouraging ADR, other aspects (to be defined), other deficiencies in the ADR process, 
agency reluctance/failure to seek award stay overrides, lack of, or deficiencies, in agency 
level protest procedures, agency reluctance to seek express options in protests, agency 
reluctance to deviate from GAO recommendations, and properly designed or executed 
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cost evaluations.  For the military agencies, agency reluctance/failure to seek award stay 
overrides, agency culture that discourages ADR or reconsideration of award decisions, 
lack of, or deficiencies in, agency-level bid protest procedures, and agency reluctance to 
deviate from GAO recommendations seem to be much more prevalent or significant than 
for civilian agencies. Figure 19 compares the ten least frequently identified responses of 
civilian agency respondents with those from military agencies. 
 
Figure 19.   Comparison of Ten Least Frequently Identified Civilian and Military Agency 
Perception of Processes, Laws, Policies, or Regulations vs.  Military Agencies. 
3. Acquisition vs. Legal Perspective 
When comparing the perspective of respondents employed as legal professionals 
with that of respondents employed as acquisition professionals, there is much similarity 
in opinion with regard to their beliefs about the use of preventive or defensive strategies 
designed to minimize the negative impacts of bid protests on the acquisition process.  
Despite this strong similarity in response, there are a few notable exceptions that bear 
mentioning.  Acquisition professionals cite a higher instance of using non-mandatory 
debriefings to unsuccessful offerors.  The mean score for this factor amongst acquisition 
professionals was 3.14, compared to a mean score of 2.40 for legal professionals.  
Similarly, acquisition professional respondents indicate that they believe their agencies 
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tend to take corrective action to include involving the protestor as a subcontractor or 
member of the winning team(s) to a greater extent than legal professionals would seem to 
indicate.   The mean score for this factor was 2.50 for acquisition professionals, while it 
was only 1.83 for legal professionals.  Legal professionals identified advance acquisition 
planning, thorough market research and engagement with industry, greater training for 
acquisition workforce, hiring or assigning additional acquisition workforce and 
awarding extensions or bridge contractors to incumbents protesting re-competitions 
more often than acquisition professionals.  The opposite relationship was for factors 
including setting in advance clear and publicly disclosed evaluation criteria and 
adhering to these criteria during evaluation, providing quality mandatory debriefings to 
offerors, agency procedures to prevent fraud, procurement integrity, or organizational 
conflict of interest violations, and agency-level protest procedures. Both groups cited 
taking early corrective action with the same frequency.  Figure 20 compares the ten most 
frequently identified practices of legal professionals with those of acquisition 









Figure 20.   Comparison of Ten Most Frequently Identified Strategies and Practices Identified 
by Legal Professionals with those of Acquisition Professionals. 
Legal professionals identified strategies and practices such as acquisition 
strategies involving shorter-term contracts, taking corrective actions involving 
declaratory-type relief such as changes to agency policies, seeking best interest 
overrides, taking corrective actions involving inclusion of protesters as subcontractors or 
members of winning teams, independent expert reviews by the GAO, and other strategies 
(to be defined) less often than acquisition professionals.  The relationship was reversed 
for strategies such as refusal to follow erroneous GAO views, vigorous objections and 
requests for sanctions with respect to frivolous protests, and express options.  Both sides 







Figure 21 compares the ten least identified strategies and practices of legal 
professionals with those of acquisition professionals. 
 
Figure 21.   Comparison of Ten Least Frequently Identified Strategies and Practices Identified 
by Legal Professionals with those of Acquisition Professionals. 
Amongst legal and acquisition respondents, the most divergent opinions on ADR 
related to the use of ADR procedures to resolve bid protests.  When asked to rate their 
agency’s use of eleven different ADR procedures, the mean score amongst legal 
respondents was 1.78, whereas the mean score amongst acquisition respondents was 1.39.  
This data indicates that ADR is not being employed to great effect to reduce costs and 
program delays.  Since ADR begins at the agency level, its lack of use is surprising.  
Acquisition managers have a desire to minimize cost and time delays, yet they are under-
utilizing a valuable tool to help them in that regard.   While these results indicate that 
ADR procedures are not employed with great frequency to resolve protests, a few 
specific areas are worth noting.  When asked to rate their agency’s use of negotiation as a 
technique to resolve bid protests, legal respondents had a mean score of 2.70 compared to 
a mean score of 2.0 for acquisition respondents.  Similarly, when asked to rate their 
agency’s use of conciliation as a technique to resolve bid protests, legal respondents had 
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a mean score of 2.20 compared to a mean score of 1.33 for acquisition respondents.  
These scores reflect the opinions of the respondents and are not necessarily reflective of 
actual agency behavior.  Nonetheless, the scores provide significant insight into how 
various personnel within an agency perceive the use of ADR techniques.  Lawyers also 
seem to participate more often in GAO outcome prediction, GAO negotiation assistance, 
ADR with the assistance of the Court of Federal Claims, hybrid techniques, summary 
trials at the Board of Contract Appeals, evaluation by third-party neutrals, mini-trials, 
other ADR (to be defined), and arbitrations than acquisition officials. Only for mediation 
is the frequency reversed.  It appears that, in contrast to lawyers, agency acquisition 
officials rarely become involved in ADR in resolving bid protests.  Figure 22 compares 




Figure 22.   Comparison of Legal and Acquisition Perspective on the use of ADR Procedures 
to resolve Bid Protests. 
In general, both acquisition and legal respondents seem to have similar 
perceptions regarding the aspects of processes policies, practices, laws, or regulations that 
preclude effective avoidance or resolution of bid protests.  Yet despite the similarity of 
opinion, the data provides some insight into the attitudes and perception of both parties.  
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Overwhelmingly, legal respondents cite poor acquisition planning as the aspect or policy 
that most often precludes effective avoidance or resolution.  The mean score of legal 
respondents for this particular factor was 3.29, indicating that they believe this factor 
precludes effective avoidance or resolution of protests with at least moderate frequency.  
Comparatively, respondents with an acquisition background also cite this factor as 
precluding effective resolution or avoidance of bid protests, albeit to a lesser extent, with 
a mean score amongst respondents of 3.00.  The factor identified as precluding effective 
avoidance or resolution of protests to the greatest extent by respondents with an 
acquisition background was the lack of fiscal disincentives for unjustified protests, with a 
mean score of 3.50.  However, respondents with a legal background scored this factor 
slightly lower, with a mean score of 2.83.  Lawyers also cited in with greater frequency 
than acquisition professionals such aspects or policies such as lack of properly trained 
acquisition workforce, failure to maintain adequate documentation of procurement 
decisions, and strategic behavior by disappointed offerors with no basis for award 
seeking to recover bid and proposal costs.  On the other hand, acquisition professionals 
also cited lack of formal sanctions at the GAO for frivolous protests, frivolous protest 
filings, and delay-seeking strategies by incumbents who have no legitimate basis for 
renewed award.  This comparison suggests that agency lawyers generally do not share 
the view of agency acquisition officials concerning the extent of compliance of agency 
procurement practices with procurement laws and regulations.  Figure 23 compares the 
ten most frequently identified factors that preclude effective resolution or avoidance of 




Figure 23.   Comparison of Ten Most Frequently Identified Acquisition and Legal 
Professionals Views on Factors that Preclude Effective Resolution or Avoidance of Bid 
Protests. 
Across the board, legal professionals seem to believe more than acquisition 
professionals that all least-cited factors except for other deficiencies in ADR process (to 
be defined) can have greater detrimental impact on effective resolution of bid protests.  
For lawyers, the least cited factors range from the lowest of other deficiencies in ADR ( to 
be defined) and regulatory/statutory provisions discouraging ADR, to agency culture that 
discourages ADR or reconsideration of decisions, to agency reluctance to seek express 
option, to lack/deficiencies in agency-level protests, to agency reluctance to deviate from 
GAO recommendations, to agency reluctance to seek stay overrides, to failure to assure 
timely discussion with offerors, to poor debriefings. For acquisition professionals, these 
factors range from the lowest of other deficiencies in ADR (to be defined), to regulatory 
or statutory provisions discouraging ADR, to agency culture discouraging ADR, to 
agency reluctance to seek express options, to lack/deficiencies in agency-level protests, to 
agency reluctance to deviate from GAO recommendations, to agency reluctance to seek 
stay overrides, to failure to assure fair discussions, to poor debriefings. Figure 24 
compares the ten least frequently identified factors that preclude effective resolution or 
avoidance of bid protests between acquisition and legal respondents. 
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Figure 24.   Comparison of Ten Least Frequently Identified Acquisition and Legal 
Professionals Views on Factors that Preclude Effective Resolution or Avoidance of Bid 
Protests. 
4. Additional Considerations 
In addition to the inherent value of the perceptions, views, and opinions offered 
by respondents, there is additional value in analyzing the nature of their responses.  The 
first survey question asked respondents to identify to what they believe to be the 
frequency of their agency’s use of various preventive and defensive strategies to 
minimize the negative impact of bid protests.   The third question asked respondents to 
identify the frequency with which they believe aspects of current policies, practices, laws, 
or regulations preclude effective resolution or avoidance of protests.   Conceptually, these 
two questions can be viewed as trying to identify two distinct ideas.   First, what do 
agencies do to minimize the impact of bid protests, and secondly what factors prevent 
effective resolution of protests?   
Intuitively, one expects that the some of the responses to these questions are in at 
least some way related.  If, respondents believe that poor acquisition planning is the 
factor that most frequently prevents the effective resolution of bid protests within their 
agency then it stands to reason that respondents should also believe that the preventive 
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strategy or practice of advanced acquisition planning is employed infrequently within 
their agency.   Conversely, if respondents believe  advanced acquisition planning is 
almost always used as a preventive strategy or practice within their agency, then one 
should believe poor acquisition planning rarely, if ever, is a factor that precludes 
effective resolution or avoidance of bid protests in their agency.  Other factors, 
specifically those that relate to frivolous protests, acquisition workforce training, 
debriefings, and agency level protest procedures have logical relationships as well.   
Figure 25 displays the mean respondent answer to the question about a specific strategy 
or practice and compares that result to the mean respondent answer to the corresponding 
question about a process or policy that precludes effective resolution or practice. 
 
Figure 25.   Comparison of Agency Defensive Strategies and Processes that Preclude 
Effective Resolution of Protests 
The results of this comparison are varied.  Some of the results are quite intuitive, 
while others are not so intuitive, and may require further research.  When asked to 
evaluate the extent to which frivolous protest preclude effective resolution or avoidance 
of protests at their agency, the mean respondent score was 2.83.   This indicates that they 
believe frivolous protests may preclude effective resolution or avoidance of protests to a 
moderate extent.   A natural strategy for an agency wishing to counteract a frivolous 
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protest would be to vigorously object to the protest and request sanctions in response to 
the protest.   However, amongst survey respondents, this strategy had a mean score of 
1.67.   Indicating that respondents believe their agencies only uses this particular strategy 
in rare instances.   It is certainly possible that if respondent agencies utilized a more 
vigorous approach in objecting to bid protests that the effect frivolous protests have on 
precluding effective resolution would decrease. 
Similarly, respondents indicated on average, that they believe their agencies 
utilize quality mandatory debriefings with a fairly high degree of frequency.  The mean 
score amongst respondents for this strategy was 3.3.   In comparison, on average, 
respondents indicated that they believe poor debriefings prevent effective resolution or 
avoidance of protests rarely.   The mean score for this practice was 2.35.   If in fact, 
agencies are providing quality debriefings to unsuccessful offerors, then there should be 
very few instances where a poor debriefing has prevented or precluded the effective 
resolution or avoidance of a protest.   Respondent answers to the survey seem to support 
this conclusion. 
On average, respondents indicated that they believe greater training for the 
acquisition workforce is a strategy employed by their agency to minimize the impact of a 
bid protest with somewhat less than moderate frequency.  The mean score for this factor 
was 2.71.   Similarly, respondents indicated that they believe the lack of a properly 
trained acquisition workforce is a practice that precludes effective protest resolution with 
moderate frequency.   The mean score amongst respondents for this factor was 3.0.  The 
implication here is somewhat obvious, nonetheless it bears stating explicitly.   Greater 
training for the acquisition workforce could likely result in fewer instances where a 
poorly trained workforce is a factor that precludes effective resolution of protests. 
Other results of this comparison were not so consistently logical.  Advance 
acquisition planning was cited with extremely high frequency by survey respondents.   
This indicates that they believe their agency employs this particular strategy quite often 
as a means to prevent or avoid a bid protest.   The mean score amongst respondents for 
this factor was 3.38.  However, respondents also cited poor acquisition planning with 
relatively high frequency.   The mean score amongst respondents for this factor was 3.10, 
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indicating that respondents believe, in many instances, their agency is precluded from 
effectively resolving or avoiding protests because of poor acquisition planning.   In this 
regard the results are counterintuitive.   If in fact, good advanced acquisition planning is 
happening on a regular basis, then it would seem difficult to conclude that poor 
acquisition planning is one of the most frequent practices that precludes effective 
resolution or avoidance of protests.   This may actually be a case of perception, rather 
than reality.   Quite possibly, respondents feel that acquisition planning is a consistently 
employed practice within their agency, when in fact it is not.   Or conversely, respondents 
may feel that poor acquisition planning is the most common practice that precludes 
effective protest resolution when in fact there are other factors that preclude effective 
protest resolution to a greater extent. 
F. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS 
In general, the two negative externalities (from the agency perspective) associated 
with a bid protest are program delay and increased costs.  In order to counteract each of 
these two negative externalities, there are a number of strategies an agency can employ.  
Such strategies as utilizing GAO’s express option, agency override of mandatory GAO 
stays, early corrective action, and vigorous objection to frivolous or meritless protests are 
a number of strategies that if effectively employed, could potentially reduce the delays 
associated with a bid protest.  Figure 26 compares the relative frequency with which 
respondents believe their agencies use a number of these strategies to counteract delays 
caused by bid protests. 
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Figure 26.   Relative Identification of Defensive Strategies used to Counteract Delays Caused 
by Bid Protests 
The data clearly shows that respondents believe their agencies utilize strategies 
such as agency-level bid protest procedures and taking early corrective action with fairly 
high frequency.  However strategies such as taking express requests under GAO 
procedures, vigorous objections and requests for sanctions in response to frivolous 
protests, and refusal to follow GAO advisory opinions and recommendations (where the 
GAO sustains a protest on apparently wrong grounds) are identified infrequently.  This 
implies that agencies may be under-utilizing some of the tools they possess to counteract 
the delays associated with bid protests. 
Similarly, agencies have a number of strategies they can employ to reduce the 
costs associated with bid protests.  Actions such as negotiation, use of ADR procedures, 
early corrective action, and vigorous objections to frivolous protests, are but a number of 
strategies, that if effectively employed have the potential to reduce costs.  Each of these 
processes potentially results in a resolution of the protest prior to formal adjudication.  As 




protestor.  Figure 27 compares the relative frequency with which respondents believe 
their agencies use a number of these strategies to reduce costs associated with by bid 
protests. 
 
Figure 27.   Relative Identification of Defensive Strategies used to Reduce Costs Associated 
with Bid Protests 
From this data, it appears that beyond taking early corrective action, respondents 
do not believe their agencies use any of the aforementioned strategies with great 
frequency.  The implication here is quite the same as with program delays.  It appears that 
agencies may not be effectively utilizing all the tools they have to reduce the costs 
associated with a bid protest. 
Beyond strategies to reduce costs and delays, agencies may also employ strategies 
to reduce or eliminate a disappointed or unsuccessful offerors inclination to protest for 
strategic business reasons (e.g. to gain greater insight into agency selection decisions or 
greater access to agency information).  Quality debriefings and acquisition strategies that 
involve multiple awards have the potential to reduce the number of protests filed, that are 
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motivated in part on strategic business decisions.  Figure 28 compares the relative 
frequency with which respondents believe their agencies use these strategies and 
practices. 
 
Figure 28.   Relative Identification of Defensive Strategies used to Reduce Protestor’s 
Inclination to Protest for Strategic Business Reasons 
This data shows that respondents believe their agencies utilize both mandatory 
and non-mandatory debriefings to offerors with fairly high frequency.  However, 
respondents seem to believe that acquisition strategies involving multiple contract 
awards rather than “winner-takes-all” consolidated acquisitions are employed less 
frequently.  To the extent that further employment of such an acquisition strategy is 
practicable, it may represent an opportunity for agencies to reduce the strategic business 
reasons behind a protestors filing. 
G. RESPONDENT COMMENTS AND OPINIONS 
Survey respondents were given the opportunity to provide comments regarding 
contractor motivation: to initiate protests in general, to file protests at the GAO, under 
agency level programs, at the Court of Federal Claims, to challenge an agency’s decision 
to override an automatic stay at the Court of Federal Claims, and to resolve protests 
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through ADR procedures.  Respondents were also offered the opportunity to provide 
suggestions for improvements to policies, processes, practices, laws or regulation.  The 
range of comments provided was quite diverse.  The following paragraphs summarize 
some of the common themes.   Additional comments of particular note or interest are 
included as well. 
Respondent comments largely fell into one of two categories: comments, that 
involve a strategy or practice, and comments that involve a policy, regulation, or aspect 
of law.  In regards to strategies and practices, that could potentially reduce the negative 
impact of bid protests, respondents noted issues related to training and communication, 
including the benefits of a quality debriefing.  One respondent in particular noted the 
need for “improvements in the quality, content, and context of information given in 
award debriefings [as a means] to prevent protests that are filed as ‘fishing expeditions’.”  
A number of respondents indicated that peer reviews were practices employed by 
their agency to minimize the negative impact of bid protests.  Typical responses included 
comments, such as “Peer reviews at all levels…my division has incorporated peer 
reviews for all new procurements…above Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP) 
threshold.” Another respondent noted, 
Each acquisition office has a ‘peer’ type of contract review board, which 
considers planned solicitations and contract awards over specific 
thresholds.  Senior Procurement Executive reviews all acquisition plans 
exceeding $10M and a formal Investment Review Board, including 
acquisition representation, review planned acquisitions over $75M. 
Respondents cite protestor familiarity with GAO processes, protestor’s belief in 
GAO’s independence, and the relative inexpensiveness of filing and litigating at GAO, as 
primary reasons why protestors elect to file protests with the GAO.  Respondents also 
made a number of comments regarding agency level protest procedures.  The majority of 
comments seem to indicate that trust is a major factor in the success of an agency level 
protest forum.  Namely, protestors must trust that agencies will be able to set aside any 
agency bias and issue decisions in a fair, impartial, and equitable manner.  Comments 
contained in Figure 29 seem to indicate that respondents believe protestors do not have 


















Figure 29.   Respondent Comments on Factors that Motivate or Constrain a Protestor to 
Utilize Agency Protest Procedures 
These comments are consistent with other academic studies which note “contractors and 
attorneys have voiced doubts about the general ability of procuring agency personnel to 
render fair and impartial protest decisions.”38 
In terms of policy, the lack of a financial disincentive for protestors filing a 
protest that is ultimately denied or dismissed was consistently noted by respondents.  
Figure 30 lists some of the most common comments regarding the lack of disincentives 
for filing frivolous or meritless protests. 
 
 
                                                 
38 Erik A. Troff, “The United States Agency-Level Bid Protest Mechanism: A Model for Bid 























Figure 30.   Respondent Comments on the Lack of Disincentives to Protest 
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V. ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 
AND ARMY MATERIAL COMMAND AGENCY PRACTICES 
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE FAA’S ODRA PROCESS 
In an effort to transform the National Airspace System, Congress specifically 
exempted the FAA from all procurement laws and acquisition regulations when it passed 
the 1996 Department of Transportation Authorization Act.39  Congress mandated that the 
FAA develop a new and distinct acquisition system.  Utilizing advice and opinions from 
public and private sector experts, the FAA created the Acquisition Management System 
(AMS).  AMS became the system used by the FAA to procure the material, resources, 
and services it would need to carry out its mission. 
With the implementation of AMS, it became clear that the FAA and its 
contracting partners would no longer have access to the GAO as a forum to resolve bid 
protests.  As a result, in 1997 the FAA created a new office, known as the Office of 
Dispute Resolution for Acquisition (ODRA).  The ODRA is the statutorily designated 
forum for all contract disputes and bid protests arising under the FAA’s AMS.40  At the 
core of the ODRA dispute resolution process is a belief that it is in the interests of both 
the FAA and its private sector partners to work together to voluntarily resolve 
procurement related disagreements in a timely and equitable manner. 
Congress directed the Administrator of the FAA to ensure that at a minimum, the 
AMS resolved “bid protests and contract disputes related thereto, using consensual 
alternative dispute resolution techniques to the maximum extent practicable.”41   Under 
this system, formal litigation should only be employed as a last resort to resolve a bid 
protest.  As noted in the Vision 100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act of 2003, 
The resolution of bid protest and contract disputes related thereto, using 
consensual alternative dispute resolution techniques to the maximum 
extent practicable…a bid protest or contract dispute that is not addressed 
                                                 
39 United States Code, 49 § 40110(d)2. 
40 United States Code, 49 § 40110(d)3. 
41 United States Code, 49 § 40110(d)1(B). 
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or resolved through alternative dispute resolution shall be adjudicated by 
the Administrator through Dispute Resolution Officers or Special Masters 
of the FAA ODRA.42      
ADR produces a faster and less costly outcome when compared to litigation.43 
The FAA has successfully used ADR to resolve most of the protests brought before the 
ODRA.  Additionally, through ADR, the parties themselves maintain control over the 
process and usually end up structuring a settlement that produces a “win-win” situation 
for those involved.  Unlike litigation, ADR helps the parties involved preserve a mutually 
beneficial and amicable business relationship with one and other.  In the simplest of 
terms, the ODRA process was designed with the goal of providing a fair, fast, and 
efficient resolution to disputes and protests under adjudication standards outlined in the 
Administrative Procedures Act.44  
Because the ODRA expects both parties to attempt ADR, most cases, almost 
universally are resolved through ADR.  Further, the decision to use ADR is not left up to 
the discretion of the parties involved, but rather it is immediately discussed during the 
initial status conference, which is normally held within the first five (5) business days 
after a protest filing.45  
B. KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FAA AND GAO’S BID PROTEST 
PROCESS 
In terms of volume, the caseload at GAO is significantly larger than at ODRA.  In 
an average year ODRA handles about fifty-five (55) protests, compared to the more than 
1,400 protests filed at GAO.46  The GAO however has a larger staff, and has been issuing 
decisions on bid protests since the 1920s.47 On average, the GAO issues a decision 
between day seventy-five (75) and day one-hundred (100).  In certain circumstances, 
                                                 
42 Public Law 108-176, section 224b(1). 
43 Worthington and Goldsman, Contracting with the Federal Government, 472. 
44 United States Code, 5 § 551-559. 
45 Code of Federal Regulations, 14 § 17.17 (b). 
46 Federal Procurement Institute. 
47 Kepplinger, “Commentary: GAO's Bid Protest Role,” 2. 
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whether on the request of a party, or on its own initiative, GAO may utilize an express 
option, wherein a decision is made within sixty-five (65) days.48 
In comparison, the process at ODRA is normally concluded at the fifty-two (52) 
day mark.49 Since ODRA is part of the FAA, there is greater cooperative interaction 
between ODRA officers, FAA program offices, and contractors in pursuing mutually 
agreeable ADR efforts at early stages of the acquisition process, often times prior to the 
filing of a formal protest with ODRA.  Comparatively, the GAO, as an agency in the 
Legislative Branch, rarely makes recommendations or influences agency action prior to 
receipt of a protest by an aggrieved party.   
A key difference between ODRA and GAO is that ODRA uses ADR as the 
primary method of protest resolution, whereas the GAO tends to promote ADR only if 
the parties concerned are willing. Within the ODRA, there is a presumption that parties 
will utilize ADR.  In fact, within five (5) days of the initial status conference, parties 
must elect to use ADR or submit “joint or separate explanations as to why ADR 
proceedings will not be used and the Default Adjudicative Process will be needed.”50   In 
addition, even if the parties are unable to utilize ADR, the FAA may nonetheless utilize 
“informal ADR techniques…concurrently with and in parallel to adjudication.”51  
However, the greatest distinction between the two protest forums is in the character of the 
forum itself.  The GAO process is extremely formal and adversarial in nature.  Agency 
reports must be produced and defended by the agency, and the aggrieved offeror has the 
ability to offer comments on the agency report.   
In comparing the notional timeframes of a bid protest under the GAO system and 
the FAA system, one can clearly see the benefits of the FAA system.  As shown in Figure 
31, the FAA system, with its emphasis on ADR usually results in an earlier resolution of 
protest than compared to GAO procedures. 
                                                 
48 Code of Federal Regulations 4 § 21.10 
49 Richard D.  Lieberman and Jason D. Morgan, The 100 Worst Mistakes in Government Contracting 
(Ashburn: National Contract Management Association, 2008), 29. 
50 Code of Federal Regulations, 14 § 17.17 (b)1(c). 
51 Code of Federal Regulations, 14 § 17.31 (c). 
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Figure 31.   Comparison of GAO52 vs.  FAA53 Timeline of Key Protest Milestones. 
C. THE U.S.  ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND’S AGENCY LEVEL 
PROTEST PROGRAM. 
Under the authority of FAR part 33.103(c), AMC attempts to use a progressive 
approach, coupled with creative initiatives in an effort to meet its litigation challenges.  
The objectives of the AMC ADR program are to utilize an interdisciplinary approach to 
address conflict resolution and to design processes that enable the parties to foster 
creative, acceptable solutions.   The result are expeditious decisions that require fewer 
resources than formal litigation.54 
The primary steps in AMC’s ADR process include negotiation, mediation, fact-
finding, arbitration, and mini-trial.  Commonly used definitions of these terms and other 
ADR terms applicable to procurement related ADR are contained in Appendix A.   In 
1991, this process was developed and within four years the AMC-Level Protest Program 
                                                 
52 Code of Federal Regulations 4 § 21.0, et seq. 
53 Code of Federal Regulations 14 § 17.0, et seq. 
54 Alternative Dispute Resolution Program, passim. 
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was designated as one of the “Ten Best Government Procurement Practices” by the 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy.  The 1995, Executive Order 12979 directing 
federal agencies to allow protests to be filed at an agency level above the CO was a 
process modeled after the AMC-Level Protest Program.55  
Some of the remedies offered by AMC’s Level Protest Program include the 
following: 
 Contract termination 
 Recompetition of requirement 
 Solicitation revision 
 Direction to not exercise an option 
 Contract award 
 A combination of the above 
Using these remedies, AMC has resolved hundreds of protests in-house, avoiding the cost 
of litigation associated with a protest at GAO.  In order to reduce the number of protests, 
AMC places a strong emphasis on conducting meaningful debriefings.    This strategy 
supports the agency’s ADR initiative.   AMC encourages its activities and contractors to 
“partner.” This is a philosophy and process that emphasizes open communication and 
early identification of potential problems.  The partnering parties work together to 
develop a charter that identifies common goals and objectives that the parties are 
committed to achieving together.   The non-adversarial nature of this technique seems to 
have improved the nature of the relationship between AMC and its contractors. 
Consistent with President Clinton’s Executive Order, which still remains in effect, 
AMC has developed an iterative strategic planning process to better coordinate ADR 
programs.  The goal of this effort is to better leverage ADR resources and to create 
greater knowledge about ADR processes throughout the Army. 
AMC is working to expand ADR training opportunities for lawyers and non-
lawyers alike.  In an effort to identify conflicts likely to benefit from ADR, but for which 
there exists no well established ADR program, AMC has increased its focus on 
                                                 
55 U.S. Army Materiel Command, 5. 
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information collection from the field.   AMC’s Office of Command Counsel is pooling 
the resources and knowledge available at field installations, with an eye towards 
expanding the use of ADR in areas, such as Equal Employment Opportunity, labor-
management relations, and environmental stewardship.56 
D. KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AMC AND GAO’S BID PROTEST 
PROCESS 
 Like the FAA, the number of protests filed with AMC is significantly 
smaller than the number of protests filed with GAO.  AMC handles about seventy-five 
(75) protests per year compared to the over 1,400 protests filed with GAO in a given 
year.   Average decision times however are shorter at AMC.  AMC is able to issue its 
decisions within fifteen (15) days, far in advance of the thirty-five (35) day requirement 
of Far Part 33.57  Comparatively, under the express option decisions at GAO are issued 
within sixty-five (65) days at GAO or between seventy-five (75) and one-hundred (100) 
days under GAO’s normal adjudicative process.   Figure 32 compares the AMC’s protest 











                                                 
56 Recent Army ADR Achievements, 1. 









Figure 32.   Comparison of GAO58 vs.  AMC59 Timeline of Key Protest Milestones 
                                                 
58 Code of Federal Regulations 4 § 21.0, et seq. 
59 Alternative Dispute Resolution Program, passim. 
  62
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALY LEFT BLANK 
  63
VI. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 
Clearly, best practices exist within the federal government.  The FAA and AMC 
programs represent two leading edge programs, designed from the outset to create a 
harmonious business relationship between government and private industry.   The 
professional men and women who staff the acquisition and legal offices in the federal 
government are another clear source of best practices.   Their tremendous professional 
knowledge, significant expertise, and practical experience were the basis for our research 
survey.  
Acquisition managers are no doubt interested in reducing program costs and time 
delays.  Some of the more effective ways to do so are to employ ADR processes to the 
maximum extent practicable, seek overrides of mandatory stays when in the best interests 
of the government, to take voluntary corrective action when appropriate, and to raise 
objections to protests that are frivolous or otherwise lack merit. From our research, it 
seems that in many instances such practices are often under-utilized or not employed at 
all.  We are left with a number of answers to the research questions considered at the 
beginning of this project.   
A. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Strategies and Practices Employed 
 What strategies or practices are currently being used to minimize the 
impact of bid protests on the acquisition process while maintaining 
integrity, economy, and efficiency? 
Our research has shown that there are numerous strategies and practices currently 
being used to minimize the impact of bid protests on the acquisition process, while 
maintaining the ideals of integrity, economy, and efficiency.  From review of procedures 
at the FAA and AMC, we see that ADR is being utilized as an effective tool to minimize 
the impact of protests.   What characterizes the ADR programs of both FAA and AMC as 
so successful is the presumption that all protest will be resolved through ADR, unless 
there are countervailing reasons to the contrary.   
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From our survey of acquisition and legal professionals, a number of these 
practices have been identified:   
 Setting in advance clear and publicly disclosed evaluation criteria and 
adhering to these criteria during source selection. 
 Advanced acquisition planning. 
 Agency procedures to prevent fraud, procurement integrity violations, 
and/or organizational conflicts of interests. 
 Providing quality mandatory debriefings. 
 Thorough market research and engagement with industry. 
 Agency level protest procedures. 
Some of the comments we received from survey respondents also demonstrate 
that institutional peer reviews are practiced by many federal agencies.  Peer reviews may 
go beyond just merely reviewing a CO’s technical documentation.   Peer reviews can 
encompass a review of overall acquisition strategies. 
2. Barriers to Effective Resolution 
 What current processes or regulations preclude effective avoidance or 
resolution of bid protests in a manner that minimizes adverse impact on 
the acquisition system? 
Our survey identified a number of process and regulations that preclude effective 
resolution or avoidance of bid protests.  Some of the most common processes, 
regulations, and policies include: 
 The lack of fiscal disincentives for unjustified protests such as “loser 
pays” arrangements. 
 Poor acquisition planning. 
 Lack of properly trained acquisition workforce. 
 Frivolous protest filings. 
 Lack of formal sanctions at the GAO for frivolous protests. 
3. Obstacles to Effective Cooperation 
 What are the obstacles that impede effective cooperation in resolving bid 
protest? 
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Most legal and acquisition professionals surveyed indicate that they believe that 
their agencies do not use ADR to a great extent to resolve protests.  However, the 
research we conducted regarding the FAA and AMC, show the clear benefit of utilizing 
ADR.   At both the FAA and AMC bid protests are resolved earlier than they are at GAO.   
It appears that for most agencies, a reluctance to utilize ADR as a means to resolve 
protests is an obstacle that impedes effective cooperation. 
Our research survey also indicates that there may be other reasons, beyond agency 
cooperation, that create obstacles to more effective cooperation between industry and 
government.  Numerous survey respondents cited the fact that they believe agency level 
protest procedures could be more effective, if unsuccessful offerors had greater trust in 
the agency.   In this regard, trust seems to be a major obstacle in more effective 
cooperation.   If protestors do not trust agencies to take remedial action when appropriate, 
then effective cooperation between the two parties is impaired. 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Case for Fiscal Disincentives beyond Truly Frivolous is not 
Demonstrated   
Our research has revealed that agency personnel have strong opinions regarding 
the need for some type of disincentives for unsuccessful protestors.  The opinions range 
from “loser pays” scenarios, where the losing party to the protest must reimburse the 
other for the cost of the unsuccessful litigation, to more reserved opinions, where 
penalties are only assessed for those protests that are deemed to be truly frivolous. 
There is no doubt that the lack of disincentives for filing an unsuccessful protest 
may contribute to the litigious desires of a would-be protestor.  Nonetheless, we are not 
convinced that such disincentives are prudent.   While such a procedure may very well 
reduce the negative impact frivolous protests have on the acquisition system, it may do so 
at the expense of legitimate protests.   Such disincentives may actually discourage 
participation in the federal contracting process and as a result competition may 
decrease.60  Further, in order to determine whether or not a protest is indeed frivolous, it 
would require additional action on the part of the GAO.   Currently, GAO determines 
initially whether or not a protest meets the requirements for filing a protest (timely, an 
interested party, etc…) and subsequently determines the merit of the protest.   In order to 
determine that a protest is sanctionable as frivolous, GAO would have to make a separate 
determination. Under Rule 11 of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims, a protester can 
be sanctioned only if the protest: 
(1) is being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause 
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; 
                                                 
60 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 09-401197, 13. 
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(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law 
or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for 
establishing new law;  
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so 
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further 
investigation or discovery; and  
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if 
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.    
Necessarily, a protestor would have some right to due process in order to “avoid 
punishing a company for filing a good-faith but unmeritorious protest.”61  This process 
may actually make the overall protest process longer, which could have potential 
negative impacts on the acquisition system.   
2. Agencies must Vigorously Object to Protests when Appropriate 
Related to the matter of frivolous protests are agency actions designed to properly 
document their objections to a protest.  The GAO “dismisses protests, where appropriate, 
without the need to resolve whether the protest was frivolous.”62  It is incumbent on 
agencies however, to object to protests when appropriate.   Our research revealed that 
many acquisition and legal professionals believe frivolous protests frequently preclude 
effective resolution of bid protests.   Yet the very same individuals indicated that they 
believe their agencies infrequently raise vigorous objections in response to frivolous 
protests.   Since the GAO will dismiss protests that are without merit, it is incumbent 
upon agency officials to raise objections to protests they deem to be frivolous or 
otherwise without merit.   
3. Provide Quality Debriefs to Prevent or Limit Strategic Protests 
Numerous survey respondents provided comments regarding the strategic reasons 
that may induce an unsuccessful offeror to file a protest.  One respondent called such 
                                                 
61 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 09-401197, 13. 
62 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 09-401197, 12. 
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protests “fishing expeditions” while another stated it was a means to “circumvent FOIA.”  
Respondents’ rationale is that by filing a protest, even if ultimately unsuccessful, the 
protestor may obtain some information that he can later use to his advantage.  One means 
by which agencies can prevent such behavior is to provide a high quality debriefing.   If 
an unsuccessful offeror has been thoroughly debriefed as to why he was not selected for 
award, he may not feel he needs any additional information, and as a result he may be 
less inclined to file a protest.   A thorough debrief may also convince an unsuccessful 
offeror that he was in fact not prejudiced by the agency’s decision and therefore has no 
need to file a protest. 
Even with complete and thorough debriefs; some protestors will want to file a 
protest in order to seek information not otherwise available to them.  A change in agency 
policy could prevent this occurrence.   The information asymmetry that exists between 
the government and unsuccessful offerors may very well influence an offeror’s decision 
to protest.   Government agencies can prevent this from occurring by eliminating or 
reducing the asymmetry.   Information that is normally made available to an unsuccessful 
offeror only after having filed a protest should be made available to the offeror absent a 
formal protest filing.   This may eliminate one incentive that an unsuccessful offeror has 
in filing a protest. 
4. Require Parties to Document Decision not to use ADR and other 
Similar Tools 
Our review of ODRA procedures highlighted the primary use of ADR to resolve 
protests.  We noted the fact that ODRA was able to resolve protests more quickly than 
when compared to the GAO’s bid protest process.  Within ODRA, there is an overriding 
presumption that parties will resolve protests through ADR.  If unable to utilize ADR, 
both parties must submit explanatory statements to the Dispute Resolution Officer.  The 
presumption that parties will utilize ADR, unless there is a countervailing reason to the 
contrary, is a primary driver behind ODRA’s processes.  The GAO in its regulations and 
the Executive Branch through the Federal Acquisition Regulation should adopt a similar 
procedural policy, and require each party to conduct cost-benefit analysis and 
affirmatively demonstrate why ADR cannot be utilized to resolve the protest.  Such a 
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policy would likely reduce the time delays and costs an agency must endure during a bid 
protest.  Agencies can also be required to formally demonstrate why it does not seek 
dismissal, early corrective action, or stay overrides.   
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Our research has revealed a number of further areas of study that warrant 
additional research.  Specific areas of study include: 
 Analyze and document contractor motivation to file a protest.   Such 
research should include a thorough understanding of the business 
decisions that either constrain or enhance a contractor’s motivation to file 
a protest. 
 Conduct further analysis into debriefing procedures.  Best practices for 
conducting a successful debriefing need to be researched and documented. 
 Research into areas of strategy and practices that survey respondents cited 
with minimal frequency.  A number of these strategies and practices 
appear useful in mitigating the negative effect of reducing the impact of 
bid protests, yet they are underreported in our research.   Further study 
into this area should be conducted. 
 Acquisition planning is cited the most commonly cited strategy or practice 
to minimize the impact of bid protests on the acquisition process.  Best 
practices for all facets of acquisition planning should be researched and 
documented. 
 The lack of financial disincentives for unsuccessful offerors was a highly 
cited policy that precludes the effective resolution or avoidance of bid 
protests.  Although we have previously stated our recommendation on this 
policy, we nonetheless feel that further research is warranted.   
Specifically, research must be conducted into the negative externalities 
that may be associated with financial disincentives. 
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APPENDIX A.  ADR DEFINITIONS 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ELECTRONIC GUIDE TO FEDERAL PROCUREMENT ADR 
ADR Definitions 
 
The following are some commonly used definitions of ADR terms applicable to 
procurement-related ADR.  Agencies may differ in the manner in which they define such 
terms.  Also, some of these terms may be used differently in other contexts. 
Arbitration - A dispute resolution process whereby a neutral third-party is empowered 
by agreement of the parties to issue a decision on the controversy, following the conduct 
of a trial-like hearing.  An arbitrator's decision is generally binding and not reversible, 
absent fraud or misconduct on the part of the arbitrator.  Arbitrators often are asked to 
attempt to mediate (see below) a settlement first, and to impose a decision on the parties 
only as a last resort.  This hybrid process is frequently referred to as "Med/Arb". 
Conciliation - Efforts by a neutral third party to assist in the resolution of an issue in 
controversy, including holding meetings with individual parties to discuss the 
controversy and potential solutions; contacting individual parties by telephone or mail, 
and serving as a conduit for information between them. 
Early Neutral Evaluation - The process by which an neutral third party imparts to the 
parties his/her views as to the strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions 
relating to an issue in controversy.  This process frequently is combined with conciliation 
or mediation. 
Fact Finding - A process in which a neutral third party assists the parties to determine in 
an objective manner the facts relating to an issue in controversy.  Frequently, fact finding 
will be engaged in as a prelude to mediation. 
Mediation - An effort by a neutral third party to resolve an issue in controversy through 
the conduct of face-to-face meetings between the disputing parties.  The third party is not 
authorized to impose a settlement upon the parties, but rather seeks to assist the parties in 
fashioning a mutually satisfactory solution to the issue in controversy.  Mediation can 
take two forms: (1) facilitative mediation -- in which the mediator simply facilitates 
discussions between or among the parties and does not provide any form of evaluation of 
the merits of their respective positions; and (2) evaluative mediation -- in which the 
mediator provides the parties, either individually or jointly, with early neutral 
evaluation (see above), i.e., his/her views as to the strengths and weaknesses of their 
respective positions, in conjunction with the mediator's efforts to help the parties fashion 
an amicable resolution to their controversy. 
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Mini-Trial - A procedure where the parties make abbreviated presentations to a neutral 
third party who sits with the parties' designated principal representatives as a mini-trial 
panel to hear and evaluate evidence relating to an issue in controversy.  The neutral may 
thereafter meet with the principal representatives to attempt to mediate a settlement.  The 
mini-trial process may also be a prelude to the neutral's issuance of either a formal 
written non-binding advisory opinion or to the neutral's rendering of a binding arbitration 
award. 
Ombuds - An individual who has been designated as a confidential and informal 
information resource, communications channel, complaint-handler and dispute-resolver. 
The ombuds role was intended to be an antidote to abuses of governmental and 
bureaucratic authority and administration, and ombuds may serve as effective intervenors 
in cases of arbitrary decision making.   
Summary Trial With Binding Decision - A binding ADR procedure utilized by Boards 
of Contract Appeals wherein the parties make abbreviated evidentiary presentations 
concerning an issue in controversy, and the Board judge renders a summary binding and 
non-appealable decision.  The decision, frequently rendered from the bench, may not be 
used as precedent in the future. 
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APPENDIX C.  LIST OF FEDERAL AGENCIES SOLICITED 
Department of Agriculture  
Department of Commerce  
Department of Defense (DLA) 
Department of Education 
Department of Energy 
Department of Health and Human Services 
Department of Homeland Security (Coast Guard) 
Department of Housing and Urban Development 
Department of Interior 
Department of Justice  
Department of Labor 
Department of State 
Department of the Air Force 
Department of the Army  
Department of the Navy (Navy and Marine Corps) 
Department of Transportation 
Department of Treasury  
Department of Veterans Affairs  
General Services Administration  
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
U.S.  Agency for International Development 
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